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Summary
One cannot study poverty in Tanzania without understanding the agricultural sec-
tor, which employs more than two-thirds of the population and accounts for nearly
a quarter of national GDP. This thesis examines three themes that focus on the dif-
ficulties that rural Tanzanians face in achieving a reasonable livelihood: the adverse
legacy of a failed historical policy, a di cult climate, and market failures.
The first empirical chapter examines the legacy of the villagization program that
attempted to transform the predominantly agricultural and rural Tanzania. Between
1971 and 1973, the majority of rural residents were moved to villages planned by
the government. This essay examines if the programs e↵ects are persistent and
have had a long-run legacy. It analyzes the impact of exposure to the program on
various outcome measures from recent household surveys. The primary finding of
this study is that households living in districts heavily exposed to the program have
worse measures of various current outcomes.
The second empirical chapter examines the role of reliability of rainfall, which is
important in Tanzania as agriculture is predominantly rain-fed and a small fraction
of plots are irrigated. This chapter investigates if households cope with this major
risk to income by re-allocating their labor supply between agriculture, wage labor,
and self-employment activities. This chapter combines data on labor allocation of
households within and outside of agriculture from the National Panel Survey with
high-resolution satellite-based rainfall data not previously used in this literature.
The primary finding of this study is that households allocate more family labor to
agriculture in years of good rainfall and more labor to self-employment activities in
years of poor rainfall.
Market failures are often cited as a rationale for policy recommendations and
government interventions. The third chapter implements four tests of market failures
suggested in the literature, all of which rely on the agricultural household model
but di↵er in how market failures are manifested. The common finding of these tests
is that market failures exist in agricultural factor markets in Tanzania, although
significant heterogeneity exists. Markets are more likely to fail in rural areas, remote
locations, and are more likely to a↵ect female-headed households. Households are
also more likely to face market failure when they try to supply labor to the market
than when they try to hire labor from the market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A salient feature of economic development is that as countries become richer, ag-
riculture plays a relatively smaller role in the economy (Alston and Pardey, 2014;
Timmer, 2009). Many have argued that agriculture needs to be prioritized in the
early stages of development because of its important linkages to economic growth
and poverty reduction (Gollin et al., 2002; Christiaensen et al., 2011).1 In Tanzania,
as in many developing countries, agriculture is a major provider of food, employ-
ment, and export earnings. According to o cial statistics, the Tanzanian economy
stagnated between independence in 1961 until the 1990s, but has seen rapid growth
in the last 15 years. Yet despite the rapid economic growth, monetary poverty has
not fallen significantly (Arndt et al., 2015). One cannot study poverty in Tanzania
without understanding the agricultural sector, which employs more than two-thirds
of the population and accounts for nearly a quarter of national GDP. Securing im-
provements in agriculture through, for example, removing the bottlenecks in this
sector could help reduce poverty. This thesis examines three themes that focus on
the di culties that Tanzanians face in achieving a reasonable livelihood: a di cult
climate, the adverse legacy of a failed historical policy, and market failures.
The first empirical chapter examines the legacy of the villagization program that
attempted to transform the predominantly agricultural rural sector. After inde-
1Dercon and Gollin (2014) provide a summary of this literature that goes back to the Lewis
(1954) model as well as the work of Johnston and Mellor (1961).
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pendence, President Julius Nyerere embarked on a social transformation, a major
component of which was to relocate its scattered population to concentrated and
planned villages where people could live and work together. Between 1971 and 1973,
the majority of rural residents were moved to villages planned by the government.
However, Tanzania soon faced an economic crisis and the program was abandoned
in the late 1970s. Scholars have documented the disastrous consequences of this pro-
gram on rural livelihoods (Collier et al., 1986). This essay examines if the program’s
e↵ects were persistent and have had a long-run legacy. In order to do so, it ana-
lyzes the impact of exposure to the program on various outcome measures from the
Household Budget Survey, National Panel Survey, and the Tanzanian Census. The
concern with this analysis is that villagization may have been implemented more
heavily in areas that were more likely to be poor economic performers in the future.
In order to address this potential endogeneity, I instrument the implementation of
villagization at the district-level with sporadic droughts across Tanzania exploited
by the government to force people into planned villages. I find that households
living in districts that were heavily exposed to the program have worse measures
of various outcomes. I finally suggest that a reason villagization adversely a↵ected
living standards was because agriculture was ignored households living in heavily
villagized districts are still engaged predominantly in agriculture at the expense of
self-employment or wage activities.
A major factor that makes it di cult to rely on agriculture as a means of live-
lihood is that households are often at the mercy of the natural environment. The
second empirical chapter examines the role of one measure of the Tanzanian envir-
onment reliability of rainfall. Unreliable rainfall is a particularly important factor
in Tanzania as agriculture is predominantly rain-fed and a small fraction of plots
are irrigated.2 This issue is also important in the context of climate change, one
consequence of which is thought to be more variable rainfall (IPCC, 2007; Collier
et al., 2008). How do households cope with this major risk to income? I examine
2According to the Household Budget Survey 2011/12, 6.6% of plots in mainland Tanzania are
irrigated.
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whether households diversify their livelihoods outside of agriculture so that they are
less subject to rainfall shocks. Since labor is an important asset of poor households,
understanding how it is used to manage risk may help us devise appropriate policies
to address this issue. This study pays careful attention to the multiple activities
in which households are engaged. This e↵ort is aided by the use of the Tanzanian
National Panel Survey, which collected rich data on labor allocation of households
within and outside of agriculture. I combine this data with high-resolution satellite-
based rainfall data not previously used in this literature. I find that households
respond to rainfall shocks by participating in non-agricultural activities. In particu-
lar, I find they allocate more family labor to agriculture in years of good rainfall and
more labor to self-employment activities, such as small-scale retail trade, in years
of poor rainfall. I find that they do not use wage labor as a coping mechanism to
respond to rainfall shocks, perhaps due to market imperfections.
The third empirical chapter examines the issue of market failures in agricul-
tural factor markets in Tanzania. The e cacy of policies a↵ecting rural households
in countries like Tanzania depends much on how well markets work and market
failures are often cited as a rationale for policy recommendations and government
interventions. This chapter first attempts to quantify the extent of market particip-
ation in agricultural factor markets of in Tanzania. It then implements four tests
of market failures suggested in the literature, in contrast to most studies in the lit-
erature that rely on a single method. All of the tests are based on the agricultural
household model described in Singh et al. (1986) but di↵er in how market failures
are manifested. The intuition of these tests is that if markets are working well, then
household labor demand in production is uncorrelated with its endowment of labor
and the shadow wage of household labor will be equal to the market wage. The com-
mon finding of these tests is that market failures exist in agricultural factor markets
in Tanzania, although significant heterogeneity exists. Markets are more likely to
fail in rural areas, remote locations, and are more likely to a↵ect female-headed
households. Households are also more likely to face market failure when they try to
14
supply labor to the market than when they try to hire labor from the market.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 briefly describes the
Tanzanian context relevant for this thesis. Chapter 3 examines whether the con-
sequences of Tanzania’s villagization program on living standards are still being felt
today. Chapter 4 examines whether households cope with rainfall shocks by diversi-
fying their income-generation activities outside of agriculture. Chapter 5 examines
how well markets function by implementing various tests of market failure. Chapter
6 summarizes the findings of this thesis before discussing the limitations of this work
and suggesting potential avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2
A brief background on Tanzania
The purpose of this chapter is to set the context for the empirical analysis conducted
in this thesis. First it presents some basic facts about Tanzanian geography. Then
it discusses in broad outline its recent history, focusing in particular on the last few
decades. It then describes the structure of the Tanzanian economy and where the
country currently stands in the process of economic development. It finally discusses
how the rest of this thesis relates to the themes raised in this chapter.1
2.1 Geography
Tanzania is a country of 50.75 million people (in 2014) with an area of 0.95 million
square kilometers located on the eastern coast of Africa between 1-11  S. Nearly four
times the size of the UK and more than twice that of Germany, it is geographically
diverse. It is divided roughly into two halves by the Great Rift Valley which runs
vertically across the center. The north-eastern part of the country is mountainous
and includes the tallest mountain in Africa, Kilimanjaro. The center of the country
is a plateau, although mountains and lakes punctuate many parts of the country.
Tanzania’s climate is tropical but has regional variation due to its topography.
1Tanzania has ignited much scholarly and political interest since independence. Coulson (2013)
describes the Tanzania of the 1970s, in particular, the University of Dar es Salaam, as a mael-
strom of ideas and debates among historians, political scientists, sociologists, and economists. For
example, Joan Robinson spent a term there in the 1970s.
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The central plateau gets as little as 500 mm of rainfall per year but the western and
southern areas get up to 2,000 mm of rainfall per year. The northern part of the
country has two rainfall seasons during October-December and March-May whereas
the southern part of the country has a single rainfall season during November-
April. Due to its size, Tanzania borders many countries: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, DR Congo, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique (Figure 2.1) and has a
coastline on its eastern side of about 1,400 kilometers with the Indian Ocean.
Figure 2.1: Map of Tanzania (Source: Google Maps)
2.2 Brief history
Tanzania’s strategic location along the East African coast and its borders with
many countries has also meant it has been an important center of trade in history.
Tanzania’s first contact with the rest of the world was perhaps through Arabic
traders that settled in the Kilwa and Zanzibar islands to channel ivory, gold, and
slaves from the interior of the country. Mainland Tanzania (then called Tanganyika)
was ruled by the Germans as a part of German East Africa from 1884 until the end
17
of the First World War, when it began to be administered by Great Britain under
a League of Nations mandate. Tanganyika gained sovereign status in 1961, with
Julius Nyerere as its first prime minister. It united with Zanzibar in 1964 to become
the United Republic of Tanzania.
Julius Nyerere was a charismatic and widely-respected leader with a socialist
vision for a new Tanzania, on which he elaborated in the Arusha Declaration in
1967. A major component of Nyerere’s socialist vision (ujamaa) was to relocate its
predominantly rural population to planned villages modeled after collective farms
in China. Nyerere’s vision was that people would not only live together in these
villages but would also work together for the common good. The villagization drive
was implemented primarily during 1973-75 and by the late-1970s, four-fifths of the
population lived in government-designated villages. In the late-1970s, Tanzania
faced a balance of payments crisis, on the one hand, and a war with Uganda, on
the other. These two events, combined with external pressure amidst the poorly
performing economy, led to Nyerere’s resignation in 1985 and the beginning of the
slow reversal of his policies. Under the Economic Recovery Program, led by the
IMF and the World Bank, the state began to allow a bigger role for markets. This
also meant deregulating the various state monopolies and price controls imposed
by Nyerere’s government. The liberalization program has been slow but remains
ongoing.
2.3 Structure of the economy
Drawing inferences about Tanzanian economic activity is fraught with danger given
problems with the underlying data. Jerven (2011) and Arndt et al. (2015) discuss at
length the inconsistencies between di↵erent data sources that lead to di↵erent con-
clusions about the direction of the Tanzanian economy. Statistics on the Tanzanian
economy usually cite the National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania, World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, IMF’s World Economic Outlook, or the Penn World
Tables. Although the Tanzanian government is assumed to be the source of all o -
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cial numbers, other entities often transform these data to harmonize them with their
own databases. As a result of this, one is often left with di↵erent impressions of the
state of the economy. A recent example of the fluid nature of macroeconomic statist-
ics on Tanzania is the revision of its real GDP in October 2014. The GDP estimate
was revised to incorporate the latest available information on the economy. A result
of this was that Tanzania’s nominal GDP in 2007 increased by 27.8% compared with
previous estimates (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014b). The implication of this is
that macroeconomic statistics should not be taken at face value but should instead
be taken as indications of the actual magnitude and direction rather than providing
precise estimates.
Despite concerns about the reliability of national account statistics, one thing
that is consistent among various sources is the significant role of agriculture in the
economy. According to the latest Household Budget Survey conducted in 2012,
about three-quarters of the currently employed population aged 15 years or above
reported their primary activity in the prior 12 months to be in agriculture.2 This
number appears higher than that reported in the 2012 Census, according to which,
agriculture (including livestock and fishing) employs 65.4% of the employed popu-
lation for the same age category (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014a).3 This lower
estimate may be due to the fact that the census was conducted on August 26, 2012,
which falls outside of the agricultural seasons in Tanzania.
The share of agriculture in Tanzanian GDP is not only smaller than its em-
ployment share but has shrunk over time. Using the latest available data from the
World Development Indicators, Figure 2.2 shows the sectoral shares of Tanzanian
GDP between 1990 and 2014 in real Tanzanian Shillings. Agriculture constituted
31% in of national GDP in 1990. This share began to fall in the mid-1990s and stood
2This category includes fishing but it is unclear if it includes livestock (National Bureau of
Statistics (2014a), Table 5.2). According to the HBS, 74.7% of Tanzanian mainland households
owned or cultivated some land in the previous 12 months. The HBS was conducted between
October 2011 and October 2012 and collected information on the primary activity of respondents
in the prior 12 months.
3The relevant census question asked “What type of work did [NAME] do in the week preceding
the census night?”
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at 23% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). The drop in agriculture’s share in GDP has
been absorbed almost entirely by the industrial sector. These numbers are some-
what at odds with those reported by Arndt et al. (2015), who find that the share of
agriculture in the economy dropped from 45% in 1991 to 23% in 2012. This discrep-
ancy is most likely due to the recent revision of GDP numbers by the Tanzanian
government. Figure 2.2 uses the revised estimates that were made available after
Arndt et al. (2015) was published. Despite disagreement on the magnitude of the
drop, both Figure 2.2 and the numbers reported in Arndt et al. (2015) agree that
the value-added share of agriculture in Tanzanian GDP is contracting.
Figure 2.2: Sectoral shares of Tanzania’s GDP for 1990-2014 (Source: World Bank
(2015))
Obtaining an accurate picture of Tanzania’s growth performance is di cult given
the data problems described above. However, the best data currently available,
presented in Figure 2.3, suggest that the Tanzanian economy has been growing
rapidly since the late-1990s after several decades of stagnation. It grew at an average
of 6.5% between 1999 and 2014 and its annual growth rate was never lower than
4.7% during this period. If the o cial statistics are correct, the Tanzanian economy
has made impressive progress during the last fifteen years: GDP per capita growth
is reported as 3.5% and the real per capita GDP in local currency in 2014 was 70%
greater than 15 years earlier.
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The GDP growth rates reported for Tanzania’s neighbors Rwanda, Mozambique,
Zambia, and Uganda were higher during the same period. But this does not de-
tract from the fact that Tanzania’s recent growth performance has been impressive,
particularly in the context of its more anemic growth in the previous three decades.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the following puzzle: despite the rapid economic growth
in the last 15 years, why has Tanzania’s sectoral structure changed very little? In
particular, why does agriculture still employ two-thirds of the adult working popula-
tion? Another puzzle that remains unresolved is the source of this growth. However,
a more important question these figures raise is: how, if at all, has the recent growth
performance improved the living standards of Tanzanians? These questions are part
of the motivation behind the research in this thesis.
Figure 2.3: Tanzania’s real GDP per capita
An explanation of the discrepancy between the rapid economic growth and slow
poverty reduction may be the data on consumer price inflation, which directly de-
termine changes over time of living standards. Sandefur (2013) demonstrates how
data from household surveys can be used to verify and correct the highly political
and possibly incorrect consumer price indices. He finds that doing correcting for
prices yields a more modest picture of both economic growth and poverty reduction.
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2.4 Progress in living standards
Tanzania faced many challenges when it became independent in 1961. Its pre-
dominantly agrarian population of approximately nine million lived in a natural
environment that was harsh and inhospitable. Much of the country faced nutrient-
poor soil, irregular and poor rainfall, and prevalent disease (Ili↵e, 1979). About 4%
of the population lived in urban areas and only 16% of adults were thought to be
literate in 1961 (Ili↵e, 1979). Compared with its status five decades ago, Tanzania
has made significant improvements in quality of life. Life expectancy has improved
from 43.9 years in 1961 to 61.5 years in 2013. Infant mortality has fallen from 142.7
in 1961 to 36.4 per 1000 live births in 2013. Primary school enrolment has increased
from 33.8% in 1970 (Edwards, 2012) to 84.5% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). Adult
literacy has increased from 16% in 1961 (Ili↵e, 1979) to 67.8% in 2010 (World Bank,
2015). According to Bank of Tanzania (2011), its real GDP per capita in Tanzanian
Shillings in 2010 was 65% greater than its level in 1966.
Despite the progress Tanzania has recently made, it is one of the poorest countries
in the world and still faces many of the challenges it confronted five decades ago.
According to the Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS),4 poverty in Tanzania
fell from 38.6% in 1992 to 28.2% in 2012. Although this suggests a slow but steady
progress in monetary living standards, it is surprising that this progress was not
faster given the rapid economic growth in the last 15 years. Arndt et al. (2015)
and Atkinson and Lugo (2010) argue that the somewhat inconsistent narratives
presented by the national accounts data and the household surveys may be due to
an improvement in non-monetary indicators. Arndt et al. (2015) show that Tanzania
has seen steady progress between 1992 and 2012 in measures such as water supply,
sanitation, shelter, education, and access to information.
Owens et al. (2011) and Lokina et al. (2011) suggest that the neglect of agricul-
ture may be an explanation for why poverty in Tanzanian has not fallen in recent
4HBS is a widely-used source of data on living standards is the Household Budget Surveys
(HBS), conducted every few years by the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics. These cross-
sectional surveys were conducted in 1969, 1976/77, 1992, 2001, 2007, and 2011/12.
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years. Owens et al. (2011) compare Tanzania’s experience with that of Ghana, both
of which experienced similar rates of economic growth but Ghana had more success
in lowering poverty. This may be the consequence of a greater e↵ort by Ghana in
improving its agricultural sector. Lokina et al. (2011) find that the more modest
decrease in poverty in Tanzania happened because households moved out of agri-
culture rather than the fact that agriculture had become more productive. They
find that productivity growth in agriculture actually fell in the early 2000s and that
adoption of modern inputs such as inorganic fertilizers and hybrid seeds did not
increase.
2.5 Agriculture in Tanzania
Although the 2012 Census and HBS 2011/12 are not completely consistent in the
sectoral shares of employment, both of these sources agree that agriculture is by
far the largest employer in Tanzania. According to HBS 2011/12, agriculture is
not only a rural activity but also an urban one: 88% of rural residents, 58% of
urban areas other than Dar es Salaam, and 7% of residents of Dar es Salaam report
this being their primary sector of employment. The average household owns 5.5
acres (2.2 hectares) of land. Agriculture is dominated by smallholders since 69% of
households own less than six acres of land. This sector is also mostly traditional
given the fact that 83% of households still use the hand hoe and less than 1% of
households own a tractor, tractor plough, or tractor harrow.
The use of modern inputs is low: less than 10% of households report using
each of irrigation, inorganic fertilizer, or pesticide. The main crops grown are maize
(81% of households), beans (32%), paddy (21%), potatoes (21%), groundnuts (14%),
cassava (13%), and bananas (10%). Livestock plays an important role in the rural
economy since 51% of households report owning at least one livestock. Agricultural
productivity is very low in Tanzania, compared with its neighboring countries (World
Bank, 2015). Cereal yield in 2013 was 1,417 kg/hectares, which was among the
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lowest in the world and below that of most of its neighbors.5
2.6 Conclusion
One cannot study poverty in Tanzania without understanding the agricultural sec-
tor, which employs more than two-thirds of the population and accounts for nearly
a quarter of national GDP. This thesis examines three themes that focus on the
di culties that Tanzanians face in achieving a reasonable livelihood: a di cult cli-
mate, the adverse legacy of a failed historical policy, and market failures. The first
empirical chapter examines the legacy of the villagization program that attemp-
ted to transform the predominantly agricultural rural sector. The second empirical
chapter examines the role of one measure of the Tanzanian environment reliability
of rainfall. The third empirical chapter examines the issue of market failures in
agricultural factor markets in Tanzania.
5 Tanzania’s cereal yield grew from an average of 765 kg/hectares in the 1960s to 1,387
kg/hectares in the first decade of the twentieth century. Despite this growth, its cereal yield
has been below that of most of its neighbors during this period (World Bank, 2015).
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Chapter 3
“To live in villages is an order”:
The long-term consequences of
villagization in Tanzania 1
3.1 Introduction
Various governments around the world attempted ambitious policies during the 20th
century to transform the lives of their rural citizens by resettling them (Clarke
et al., 1985).2 While some of these projects have had the intended consequences,
many more have resulted in chaos and disruption in the immediate aftermath of the
policy and subsequently over the long run. Examining such policies is important
because the past teaches us lessons on the expected and unexpected consequences
of government policy. Another reason to examine major government policies is that
di↵erences in intra-country economic outcomes may be partly explained by historical
circumstances.
This paper examines the long-term consequences of a major attempt by the
Tanzanian government in the 1970s to transform its predominantly-rural landscape
1“To live in villages is an order” is the title of a news article in The Daily News from November
7, 1973 (Coulson, 2013).
2The redistribution of the population through active policies (Clarke et al., 1985) took the form
of communal settlements (Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia), agricultural resettlement schemes
(Nigeria, Sudan), and shifting of the national capital (Nigeria, Tanzania).
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by relocating people from scattered settlements to planned, concentrated villages.3
My research question is whether within-country di↵erences in current economic out-
comes in Tanzania can be explained partly by the exposure to the villagization pro-
gram at the height of the program. Although the program was announced in 1967
as a part of the socialist vision of President Julius Nyerere elaborated in the Arusha
Declaration, much of its implementation happened between 1973 and 1975 (Figure
3.1). The goal of the program was to re-organize rural areas with the idea that the
formation of these villages would allow for scale economies and when combined with
communal e↵ort and social infrastructure projects, the lives of rural citizens would
be uplifted. By the time the 1978 census was conducted, about 75% of Tanzani-
ans were living in villages planned by the government. Collier et al. (1986) suggest
that this is one of the largest interventions in the rural development policies of any
country in history.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of study
This study is related to the broader literature on whether current economic
outcomes can be partly explained by historical circumstances (see Nunn (2014) for
a survey of this literature). Recent analysis of mass relocation programs broadly
similar to the one in Tanzania show that these programs had negative consequences
for wellbeing both in the short run, in Rwanda (Isaksson, 2013), and in the long
run, in Mexico (Dell, 2012). Much of the literature on the villagization program in
Tanzania was written in the 1980s when the near-collapse of the Tanzanian economy
in the aftermath of the villagization program attracted much international attention
(Collier et al., 1986; Bevan et al., 1988; Collier, 1988; Boesen et al., 1986). Interest
in the program waned but a recent literature has begun to revisit this issue (Osafo-
3According to the 1967 Census of Tanzania, only 5.7% of the population lived in urban areas.
Half of this population lived in Dar es Salaam, the capital city at the time.
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Kwaako, 2012; Edwards, 2014; Schneider, 2014; Lofchie, 2014). This paper builds on
and extends Osafo-Kwaako (2012), which finds that villagization led to higher levels
of education and social capital (political awareness and community participation),
but at the cost of lower levels of consumption in 2000.
I examine if the e↵ects of villagization persist three decades after the program
was abandoned. I find that exposure to villagization in the 1970s is associated
with lower levels of various measures of current outcomes: household consumption,
income, assets, and education levels. The measure of villagization that I use is the
percentage of district population in the 1978 Census that lived in villages planned by
the government. A concern with this analysis is that the intensity of villagization in
a district may have been determined by unobservable characteristics that may also
determine current outcomes. That would prevent us from making a causal statement
about the impact of the program. I address this issue by instrumenting the intensity
of villagization with droughts that occurred sporadically across Tanzania during
1973-75, when most of the program implementation happened. These droughts were
exploited by government o cials, who promised drought-relief conditional on people
moving to government villages. I find that the economic activity that households
are engaged in may be a mechanism that explains these findings: villagization may
have had a persistent and negative impact on current outcomes by preventing people
from moving out of subsistence agriculture. This paper also provides an example
of how large government projects can be expedited by unpredicted weather events
(Dell, 2012; Fenske and Kala, 2014), and how these policies could have unintended
and persistent e↵ects.
Section 2 describes the various stages of the villagization program in Tanzania.
Section 3 describes the various datasets I use in this analysis and presents character-
istics of the sample that I analyze. Section 4 explains the strategy used to identify
the relationship between villagization and current outcomes. Section 5 presents
the results of the analysis and some robustness checks. Section 6 discusses activity
choice as a potential mechanism that may explain why villagization may have led
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to worse outcomes even three decades after the program was abandoned. The final
section discusses the implications of these results.
3.2 Relevant literature
A number of countries implemented programs similar to the villagization one in
the 20th century. For example, the Soviet Union embarked on a collectivization
campaign during 1929-1932 that had disastrous consequences for agricultural pro-
duction. Agricultural output in the Soviet Union in 1933 was 20% below the level in
1928 immediately before the collectivization campaign began (Holland, 1988). China
also implemented a similar campaign during 1959-1961, a consequence of which was
that grain output in 1961 and 1962 were 30% lower than the level in 1958 (Lin,
1990). The country also experienced famines in the immediate aftermath of the
campaigns, which resulted in 30 million deaths. Mexico began implementing land
reform in 1917 that were similar to the collectivization programs later implemented
in the Soviet Union and China (World Bank, 2001). Rural Mexican households were
organized into large farms called ejidos, which were owned by the government but
gave cultivation rights to households.
Analyses of similar programs around the world suggest that they have had ad-
verse e↵ects in the short run and long run on various aspects of wellbeing. In her
paper on the long-run consequences of a land-redistribution program in Mexico in
the early-20th century, Dell (2012) uses a similar methodology to the one employed
in this paper. She finds a strong correlation between sporadic droughts in Mexico,
which aided insurgents in their demand for land reform, and the magnitude of state
surface area that was eventually redistributed to communal ejidos. She finds that
the ejido communities now are substantially poorer, more agricultural, and less in-
dustrial as they were burdened with restrictive land policies imposed by a political
system steeped in clientelism.
Rwanda experienced a villagization program in the 1990s, when nearly 20% of
the population was moved to imidugudu planned villages (Leeuwen, 2001). Isaksson
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(2013) suggests that although a primary goal of the program was to allow households
to economically diversify away from agriculture, imidugudu households di↵ered very
little in terms of diversification from non-Imidugudu households in 2005. Although
the program may have succeeded in resolving the shortage of housing and facilitating
reconciliation after the genocide, it had not made much headway in addressing
the income portfolios of the program beneficiaries. Kondylis (2008) also examines
the impact of displacement on agricultural production of households in Rwanda
following the re-settlement program in the 1990s. She finds that the relocation to
imidugudu areas did not increase agriculture output of households. Returnees to
policy areas also had lower returns to seeds, suggesting that relocation had resulted
in a loss of agricultural know-how. Ethiopia and Mozambique also experimented
with villagization on a smaller scale (Clarke et al., 1985; Lorgen, 2000). Although
nearly two million people in Mozambique and as many as twelve million people were
villagized in Ethiopia in the 1980s, little evidence exists on the economic e↵ects
of these programs. Zimbabwe implemented a voluntary resettlement program (for
about one percent of its population) who were granted agricultural land formerly
owned by whites. Gunning et al. (2000) find that this program was immensely
successful over a period of about 13 years. Based on analysis of a panel of about 400
resettled households, they find that resettled farmers experienced not only a large
accumulation of assets but also higher returns to their assets over time.
This study builds on Osafo-Kwaako (2012), which may be the only recent study
that directly examines the legacy of the villagization program in Tanzania. Using
data from the 1988 census, he finds that the program contributed to higher levels
of education in districts that were more exposed to the villagization program had
higher levels. He also finds that districts more a↵ected by the program had higher
level of social capital (political awareness and community participation) and pro-
vision of primary schools in 2009. In addition to this, he finds that consumption
in these districts was significantly lower in 2000. This study builds on and extends
Osafo-Kwaako (2012) by emphasizing the economic consequences of the villagiza-
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tion program using the most recent data with alternative treatment measures (from
two di↵erent sources of data), outcome measures (consumption, education, asset-
ownership computed from the HBS, NPS, and Tanzanian censuses), and an improved
identification strategy that uses a richer and more reliable instrument. This study
also suggests over-reliance in agriculture as a plausible mechanism through which
villagization may have led to lower outcomes.
3.3 Villagization in Tanzania
Rationale for establishing ujamaa4 villages in Tanzania
Tanzania went through a massive transformation of its landscape and economy
during the villagization program in the 1960s and 1970s. Over the span of a decade,
the landscape was transformed from a land of dispersed, scattered dwellings into
a country in which more than three-quarters of its population lived in planned,
concentrated villages. This reorganization of the landscape originated from the
socialist ujamaa vision of cooperative living and production that its leader Julius
Nyerere laid out in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The consequences of this policy
are still not completely understood and are possibly still being experienced five
decades later.
Most Tanzanians in the 1960s lived in scattered houses spread across the land
for many reasons (Ili↵e, 1979; McHenry, 1979). The soil in most of Tanzania is
poor in nutrients and unsuitable for intensified cultivation. People adapted to this
by spreading out thinly across the country to eke out a living through shifting
cultivation and pastoralism. Wild animals were abundant and land was plentiful;
agricultural development was delayed because people could survive on hunting and
gathering. During the slave trade, there was deep distrust of other people as there
4“Ujamaa” literally means “familyhood” in Swahili. As a political philosophy, this was Nyerere’s
interpretation of socialism appropriate for the Tanzanian context. Nyerere asserted that while
“doctrinaire socialism” was a response to a class-based society with laborers and capitalists, this
was not applicable to Tanzania as it never had classes prior to colonization. Ujamaa was the
version of socialism in which everyone in society was a member of the same greater family. The
goal of ujamaa was to reverse the trend towards class di↵erentiation that he saw emerging in
Tanzania during colonization.
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was a constant fear of being enslaved through slave raids. One way to lower the
chances of being raided was to live as far away from others as possible. Finally, dur-
ing colonization from the late nineteenth century, living in concentrated settlements
meant that people would be more vulnerable to taxes and labor demands. The Ger-
mans, who ruled Tanzania from 1884 until 1918, attempted to set minimum village
size in some parts of Tanzania, but to no avail. Tanzania was under British mandate
from the end of World War I until 1961. During this period, the British attempted
to implement various policies to encourage people to live in more concentrated areas
but these policies also largely failed (McHenry, 1979).
Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania after independence from Great
Britain, had a clear vision about how Tanzanian society had to be organized in
order to improve the lives of its citizens. In his independence speech in December
1961, he said:
“If we want to develop . . .The first and absolutely essential thing to do
. . . is to begin living in proper villages . . . unless we do so we shall not be
able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and
to raise our standard of living.” (cited in Coulson (2013)).
Nyerere laid out his vision of a socialist Tanzania in the Arusha Declaration
in February 1967, in which agriculture was the cornerstone of development. Seven
months later, he issued the paper “Socialism and Rural Development,” in which he
formally launched the villagization program. In this 30-page document, he argued
that the only way to defeat poverty in Tanzania was to build rural agriculture, which
employed the vast majority of the population at the time. He proposed the primary
vehicle to build rural agriculture to be ujamaa villages, in which all Tanzanians
would “live and work together for the good of all.” The document lacked specific
details about how ujamaa villages would be organized, but he argued that living and
working in concentrated villages would not only allow for better provision of social
services such as education, health and water supply but would also enable farmers to
adopt modern methods of production such as tractors. A key feature of his proposal
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was the voluntary nature of the villages. He argued that people should be either
persuaded or shown by example that living and working together will benefit them
and provide “a more secure living.”
Stage 1: Arusha Declaration and launch of villagization program (1967-
1972)
Ujamaa villages took o↵ very slowly. Only 180 villages had been established
fifteen months after the announcement of the plan to move the entire rural Tan-
zania into ujamaa villages. Various reasons contributed to the slow take-o↵ of this
program. Nyerere’s 30-page paper announcing the program had very few practical
details on how the program was to be implemented. Even basic questions were un-
answered such as “how many households should an ujamaa village have?” or “how
close do people have to live to be called an ujamaa village?” There was no clear
role for the government or the sole party in the country, Tanganyika African Na-
tional Union (TANU), in the implementation of the program. In fact, the role of the
government was intended to be minimal and limited to persuading and educating
people about the benefits of ujamaa villages (Cli↵e et al., 1975).
Nyerere announced two changes in 1969 that sped up the establishment of ujamaa
villages (Coulson, 2013). First, the government issued a circular that ordered gov-
ernment departments to give spending priority to ujamaa villages. Second, Nyerere
allowed a limited amount of force to be used to expedite the formation of villages
although he had clearly hitherto ruled out the use of compulsion. By the end of
1970, almost 2,000 ujamaa villages had been established with close to half a mil-
lion Tanzanians living in them. Since the government had not announced a clear
demarcation of communal and private activities, private farming was prevalent in
most villages (Cli↵e et al., 1975). Most of this took the form of “block-farming,”
in which the communal land was split up into parcels that households cultivated
privately and kept its proceeds. By the end of 1972 and five years after the an-
nouncement of the villagization program, only two million people had moved into
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some 5,500 ujamaa villages across the country, less than 15% of the population at
the time (Coulson, 2013).
Stage 2: Acceleration of villagization program (1973-1975)
Nyerere was increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of movement into villa-
gization and declared in November 1973 that “to live in villages is an order” and
that everyone had to move to villages by the end of 1976 (McHenry, 1979; Coulson,
2013). Having realized that getting people to work together was going to be received
with much more resistance than living together, he practically abandoned the policy
of working together but emphasized the living together aspect of the policy going
forward. Over the next three years, various relocation operations such as “Oper-
ation Sogeza”, “Operation Dodoma”, and “Operation Imparnati” were conducted
throughout the country. Various organs of the government including the police,
army, and TANU o cials engaged in an all-out e↵ort to move people to villages
(Coulson, 2013). This often entailed showing up in rural areas in trucks and forcing
people to pack their belongings before moving them to a nearby village. Most re-
locations only covered short distances and often were only a few miles away. But
families had to leave all their belongings and their houses and move to a new place
where they would re-establish themselves. The village sites were most often decided
by party and government o cials that had little local knowledge, but the primary
criterion for site selection was that it had to be on or near an all-weather road
(Coulson, 2013).
Force was often used in moving people to villages during this stage of villagization
and included burning or tearing down of houses and other physical property. But
few incidents were reported of physical violence being used against individuals for
resisting a move to villages (Coulson, 2013; McHenry, 1979). The use of force
distinguished this phase from the first stage of the villagization program. Opposition
against the program was not significant and was limited to people hiding, fleeing,
or bribing to delay their move to villages. Most Tanzanians complied with the
villagization drive because of persuasion by party and government o cials, incentives
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promised to them, and compulsion in the form of destruction of property (McHenry,
1979). The villagization drive of 1973-1976 turned out to be immensely successful.
Approximately two million people were living in villages at the end of 1972. The
implementation was declared to have been e↵ectively implemented by the end of
1975 (Coulson, 2013). By February 1977, 13 million people, out of a population of
17 million, were living in about 8,000 villages across the country (Coulson, 2013).5
Although the drive to move people to villages was very successful, getting people
to work together was not. Households resisted working in communal farms and
the general trend was “block farming”: communal land that was split into small
parcels to be cultivated by individual households. By the end of the 1970s, a third
of all villages practiced some form of communal farming but this contributed to
less than 2.5% of national GDP, a very small fraction compared with nearly 40%
for all of agriculture (McHenry, 1979). Communal farms were most often parcels
of land that all households would contribute labor towards. The proceeds would
be allocated towards community activities such as buying water pipes or building
schools, and the rest would be shared among households. There was much more
success at non-farming activities such as building schools, dispensaries, and water
supply facilities. Communal farming did not generate much support, most often due
to confusion over the rules for working together and distributing income from the
communal farm (von Freyhold, 1979).
Aside from villagization, Tanzania also went through major changes in the eco-
nomy (Ellis and Mdoe, 2003). Major productive institutions such as manufacturing
industries, agricultural estates, and service sector enterprises were nationalized and
operated through parastatal agencies that were indirectly operated by o cials ap-
pointed by the government. The government introduced comprehensive controls on
agricultural prices and markets through crop marketing agencies. In summary, the
5The precise number of people relocated has been debated in the literature. Thomas (1985)
argues that although the 1978 Census reports that 13 million Tanzanians lived in villages, only 8-9
million were likely to have been relocated while the rest were simply labeled as o cial government
villages and counted in o cial statistics. Lorgen (2000) suggests that the relocated population
may have been as low as 5 million.
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government control of economic activity increased sharply in the decade after the
Arusha Declaration.
Stage 3: Stagnation and abandonment of villagization program (1976-
1982)
The immediate impact of the villagization program was far more positive in the
provision of public services than in agricultural production (Collier, 1988). Primary
enrolment increased from 32% in 1965 to 87% in 1985. Access to safe water in rural
areas increased from 9% in 1973 to 28% in 1985. Infant mortality fell from 139 in
1965 to 111 per 1000 live births by 1985.6 However, this was accompanied by a sharp
decline in incomes (Collier, 1988). Real per capita income in 1982/3 was between
41% and 51% 7 of the level in 1974/5 and between 55% and 68% of the level in 1969,
with urban incomes faring worse (Bevan et al., 1988). An immediate impact of the
villagization program was that the agricultural production dropped because of the
disruption caused by the unprecedented scale of dislocation (Coulson, 2013; Kikula,
1997).
This dismal situation in agricultural output was only made worse by the war
with Uganda from October 1978 to April 1979. Uganda invaded the Kagera region
of Tanzania. Tanzania then retaliated by invading Uganda and eventually ousting
the president, Idi Amin. The cost of this war for Tanzania was very heavy as the war
absorbed scarce resources and was followed by shortages in food, fuel, and imported
goods (Coulson, 2013). Agricultural exports, a major source of foreign exchange
earnings at the time, were hit seriously. Tanzanian exports of cotton, sisal, and
cashew nuts (commodities with the largest export volumes in 1970) declined by
55% , 59% , and 80% , respectively, between 1970 and 1982 (Edwards, 2014).8
This contributed to a balance of payments crisis and the implementation of an IMF
6According to World Bank (2015), Tanzania’s neighbors Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and
Malawi also witnessed big increases in life expectancy and a drop in infant mortality during this
period. Thus, it is hard to say how much of the progress in measures of human development can
be attributed to villagization and Nyerere’s other policies.
7The range captures the uncertainty in the inflation level in the late-1970s and early-1980s,
which ? argue was higher than the o cial level reported by the government.
8According to estimates in Biermann (1990), the decline in the value of exports of these com-
modities was also in a similar scale.
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and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Program in the 1980s. The villagization
program finally came to an end after the Local Government Finances Act of 1982
repealed the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975. Nyerere voluntarily left
power in 1985, after which the Structural Adjustment Program began a slow reversal
of the policies that he had introduced.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The goal of this study is to examine if villagization still has a legacy on the economic
well-being of Tanzanian households. The nature of this study necessitates the use
of data from a variety of sources and collected at di↵erent points in time. The
measure of villagization I use is the intensity of villagization, which is the share of
the district population living in planned (registered) villages in the 1978 population
census. This census collected data on the precise location and population of all
government-planned villages. According to this census, 13.7 out of 17.5 million
Tanzanians, or 78.3% of the population were living in planned villages. The average
intensity of villagization across the 94 districts in mainland Tanzania was 73%.
Zanzibar is excluded from the analysis because the villagization program was not
implemented there and it was largely governed as an independent state until the
late 1980s (Shivji, 2008).9 The primary dataset I use to examine current economic
outcomes is the Tanzania Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2011-12. Conducted
by the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, this survey is used to generate the
o cial estimate of poverty. This is a representative survey of mainland Tanzania.10
Interviews were conducted with 10,186 households, out of which 10,063 households
were included in the estimation sample after dropping observations with missing
values.
I also use data on current economic outcomes from the Tanzania National Panel
9Zanzibar is an important part of Tanzania and was merged with mainland Tanzania (previously
called Tanganyika) to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. According to the 1978 Census,
Zanzibar accounted for 0.5 million (3.1%) of the Tanzanian population.
10HBS excludes Zanzibar, but this is not a concern for this paper as Zanzibar is excluded from
all analysis.
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Survey (NPS) undertaken as a part of the World Bank’s Living Standards Meas-
urement Survey - Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) project. NPS is
a comprehensive multi-topic and panel survey that interviewed 3,265 households
in 2008/9, 3,924 households in 2010/11, and 5,011 households in 2012/13. The
full sample included 10,117 observations pooled from three NPS waves after drop-
ping observations with missing values. The second and third waves attempted to
interview all individuals covered in the first round, even if they had moved to a
di↵erent location or joined a new household. Of all the original respondents, 90%
of individuals and 95% of households were also re-interviewed in the third wave. 11
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis. The
primary outcome measure I examine is the annual per capita consumption of HBS
households. I also examine household per capita income of HBS households as an
alternative outcome measure. I analyze these same variables and household assets
using data from NPS to confirm my findings. I follow Filmer and Pritchett (2001)
to aggregate asset variables into an index using Principal Component Analysis.12
Figure 3.2 presents results from a local polynomial regression of the log of house-
hold consumption in 2011/12 on the district-level measure of villagization in 1978.13
It suggests a strong negative correlation between these two variables, although at
this point it is unclear whether or not this relationship is robust to the inclusion of
control variables. Finally, I use characteristics of Tanzanian districts to control for
geographic di↵erences prior to villagization using data collected primarily by Jensen
and Mkama (1968), who were a part of the UN Resident Mission based in Dar es
11My second measure of villagization is taken from the community questionnaire of NPS. If an
NPS community was formed during the villagization program it was asked how many new people
moved into the community as a part of the program. The possible answers to this question were
“a lot”, “some”, “very few”, or “none”. I use these two questions to categories all 349 communities
into three categories: “old village, no new residents” (14.67%), “old village, some new residents”
(13.92%), and “new village, all new residents” (71.41%).
12See Section 4.3 for further details on this method. My asset index is composed of 34 assets,
which incorporate at least some of the following types of assets: housing quality, furniture, con-
sumer durables, and productive assets. The following assets have the highest weights: television,
lighting from electricity, high-quality floor, mobile telephone, iron, fridge, sofas, and air-conditioner.
13Local polynomial regression is a non-parametric technique for smoothing scatter plots. Instead
of parametric regressions that estimate parameters for a pre-determined family of functions, this
technique relaxes that assumption so that the estimated plot fits the data more accurately. I use
the Epanechnikov kernel function to calculate the weighted local polynomial estimate.
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Salaam at that time. These data mostly come from the 1967 Census and include
the following variables: district government revenues, number of cattle heads per
person, number of dispensaries per 1,000 people, birth rate, death rate, and primary
school enrolment per head of population.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
3.5 Methodology and identification strategy
Figure 3.1 outlines the timeline of this study, in which the outcome variables during
2011/12 are a function of the intensity of villagization measured during the 1978
census. The primary specification I estimate is expressed in equation 3.1 below.
Let yi be the log of household i’s annual per capita consumption. The primary ex-
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Figure 3.2: Local polynomial regression plot of current consumption on villagization
in 1978
planatory variable is x1i, which represents the household’s exposure to villagization,
measured as a share of household i’s district population that lived in planned villages
in the 1978 census (Figure 3.3).14 X2i is a vector of covariates measured in 1967,
prior to villagization, that may also a↵ect i’s consumption during 2011-12. I also
control for a vector of current household characteristics (X3i) that may influence
household consumption.
If households are randomly subjected to the villagization variable, we could es-
timate the marginal e↵ect of villagization on current consumption by ordinary least
squares estimation on the pooled data as:
yi =  0 + x1i 1 + x2i 2 + x3i 3 + "i (3.1)
where observation i = 1, 2, . . . , N represents HBS households.  1 is our primary
coe cient of interest, and "i is an independently distributed error term. If districts in
1978 were not randomly subjected to villagization but were instead allocated due to
unobservable factors such as remoteness or socio-political reasons that are correlated
with current consumption, then the OLS coe cient of villagization is potentially
14 Figure A.1 (page 127) presents the locations of all planned villages and urban areas that the
author encoded using data from the 1978 Census.
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biased. I control for district-level covariates in order to account for other factors
that could also a↵ect household consumption. Even with these controls, unobserved
but time-varying district characteristics a↵ecting household consumption could be
a concern.
As noted above, I employ the instrumental variables (IV) technique to overcome
this identification challenge by instrumenting villagization with sporadic droughts
across Tanzania during 1973-75. I discuss the validity of this instrument in detail in
the results section. I estimate the IV model using two-stage least squares, for which
equation 3.1 is the second stage equation. The first-stage equation is:
x1i = ↵0 + zi↵1 + x2i↵2 + x3i↵3 + µi (3.2)
where zi is my instrument for the endogenous variable x1i, µ1i is the error term,
which I assume to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
The identification assumption is that the IV estimate of  1 is an unbiased estimate
of the marginal e↵ect of villagization on household consumption if the relevance
condition holds (↵1 6= 0) and the instrument is orthogonal to the error term in the
second stage, i.e. E(z0") = 0.
I instrument the intensity of villagization in 1978 with sporadic droughts across
Tanzania during 1973-75, the years when most of the villagization program was
implemented across the country. Table 3.2 suggests that these were relatively dry
years, with average rainfall across Tanzania being 0.26 standard deviations below the
long-run average. In contrast, the periods 1970-72 and 1976-78 experienced rainfall
very close to the long-run average. These droughts in certain parts of Tanzania are
widely reported in the literature as forcing the government to import large quantities
of grains to meet the shortfall in domestic production (von Freyhold, 1979; Coulson,
2013; Lofchie, 1978). Figure A.2 (page 128) shows that rainfall patterns across
Tanzania were very di↵erent between 1973-75, 1970-72, and 1976-78. A commonly
used argument and threat by government and party o cials to move people into
planned villages was that only those living in planned villages would receive drought
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Figure 3.3: Share of district population living in planned villages in 1978 (Source:
Tanzania Census 1978)
relief from the government. For example, von Freyhold (1979) says that droughts
meant “a new pressure was created to persuade outsiders to join the villages. This
took the form of distributing famine relief only to members of the Ujamaa village.”15
My instrumentation strategy improves upon a similar one adopted by Osafo-Kwaako
(2012) but uses a much richer dataset on rainfall and a more accurate method to
estimate district-level rainfall.16
I use station-level rainfall data from 279 stations across Tanzania and 53 stations
near its borders with neighboring countries Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique,
15The period between 1973-75 was not the only time when droughts were followed by announce-
ments of villagization campaigns, although this is when these campaigns were intensified and scaled
up. For example, Mascarenhas (1977) says that “[f]ollowing the drought of 1969, the government
announced that a major resettlement operation would take place and people would have to live in
planned villages.”
16Osafo-Kwaako (2012) uses data from 108 rainfall stations across Tanzania and allocates a
rainfall value from the nearest station to the entire district. I use data from 332 stations in
Tanzania obtained from the Tanzania Meteorological Association. I spatially interpolate this data
before taking district averages for analysis. Doing this is preferable to taking the value of rainfall
from one specific location in the district (as Osafo-Kwaako (2012) does), given the geographic
diversity of Tanzania.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics on instrument
Uganda, Burundi, and DR Congo.17 Two-thirds of my station data were obtained
from the Tanzanian Meteorological Agency, while the remainder were obtained from
the Global Historical Climate Network database.18 Although I have raw data on
rainfall from nearly a thousand rainfall stations across Tanzania, I keep only those
years with at least 11 months of reported data for any given station and rainfall
stations that report at least 20 years of data between 1940 and 2000.19
3.6 Results and robustness checks
3.6.1 Validity of the instruments
A major concern in my analysis is that the intensity of villagization may have been
associated with district characteristics prior to villagization that are also correlated
with current outcomes. To address this question, I examine if systematic di↵erences
exist between districts by the intensity of villagization. Table 3.3 compares 1967
characteristics of districts grouped by intensity of villagization. The last two sets
of columns contain di↵erences between the districts grouped by the intensity of
villagization. The results suggest that although there were di↵erences across districts
prior to villagization in many variables and that we need to address this fact in our
analysis.
Although the results in Table 3.3 mitigate some concerns that districts with
greater potential to be well-o↵ in the future may have been subjected less to vil-
17I spatially interpolate data from rainfall stations by kriging, a method commonly used by
geographers for this purpose (Earls and Dixon). I then take district averages of rainfall to calculate
the z-score of rainfall for each district relative to the long-run mean for 1940-2000.
18http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ghcnm/v2.php
19This ensures that the annual data on stations are as complete and accurate as possible.
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Table 3.3: Di↵erences between districts prior to villagization
lagization, the three groups of districts in Table 3.3 may have been systematically
di↵erent in unobservable characteristics. I therefore instrument villagization in or-
der to address this issue. Finally, a valid instrument should not directly a↵ect the
outcome variable but should do so only through the instrument. This can be crudely
examined by including the instrument in the OLS model. Results of this specific-
ation are presented in Column 5 of Table 3.4, where we can see that the droughts
during 1973-75 are not a significant predictor of consumption of HBS households in
2012/13 once the district villagization variable is included.
I instrument the district-level intensity of villagization with the district-level
Z-score of rainfall during 1973-75 relative to the long-run rainfall for the district
during 1940-2000. Table 3.2 suggests that rainfall during these years was 0.26 of
a standard deviation below the long-run mean, while the rainfall during the three
years before and after these years were much closer to the long-run mean. These
were also the years when the villagization program was ramped up after Nyerere
declared that “to move to villages is an order” (Coulson, 2013; McHenry, 1979;
Boesen et al., 1986). Widespread droughts were reported to be a commonly-used
excuse by o cials to force people to move to planned villages.20 Figure A.2 (page
20Households were often told that the government would not be able to provide drought relief
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Table 3.4: Determinants of the log of household per capita consumption in HBS (1st
stage IV results)
128) suggests that droughts did not occur evenly across Tanzania and that rainfall
was particularly severe around Lake Victoria in the north and in the south-west
parts of the country during 1973-75. I exploit this exogenous spatial variation in
drought as my instrument.
Table 3.4 presents estimates from the first stage of the IV estimation in which
to households that did not move to one of the new settlements (Boesen et al., 1986). Schneider
(2014) (page 322) and Bulletin of Tanzania A↵airs 1, page 10 also report of this strategy being
used by the Tanzanian government.
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we see that the Z-score of district rainfall during 1973-75 is a strong predictor of
villagization. Results in column (2) suggest that if a district received 0.26 standard
deviation less rainfall that the long-run average (the sample the average for 1973-75),
the share of a district population living in planned villages would have increased by
18 percentage points. The coe cient on the instrument is significant at the 1% level
and the Cragg-Donald F statistic in the first stage regression is comfortably above
the rule of thumb of 10 generally used in the literature.
These results are complemented by the fact that the Z-score of rainfall during
1970-72 and 1975-78 are not statistically significant predictors of villagization (Table
3.4 columns 1 and 3, respectively) and act as placebos for my instrument. When
all of these variables are included in the model (Table 3.4, column 4), only the Z-
score for 1973-75 remains statistically significant, providing more confidence in the
instrument. The magnitude of the coe cients for the Z-score of rainfall in 1970-
72 and 1976-78 is also much smaller than for 1973-75. All of these results suggest
that sporadic drought across Tanzania only had an e↵ect on villagization during the
narrow time-frame of 1973-75 and thus is a good instrument for my analysis.
3.6.2 Main results
Table 3.5 presents estimation results of the determinants of the log of household per
capita consumption. Column 1 presents the baseline results from OLS estimation.
Columns 2-6 address the endogeneity of villagization by instrumenting it with the
Z-score of rainfall during 1973-75 but also contain results from analyses on di↵erent
subsamples. Column 2 is my preferred specification as it contains results for the
full HBS sample. Columns 3-6 present results for the following sub-samples of HBS
households: residents of the largest city Dar es Salaam, residents of rural areas,
residents of urban areas, and households that are engaged in farming. All standard
errors are clustered at the district-level to account for within-district correlation in
the outcome variable.
The OLS and IV estimates are both negative and significant at the 1% level, sug-
45
Table 3.5: Determinants of the log of household per capita consumption in HBS
(2nd stage IV results)
gesting a negative impact of the villagization program. The IV coe cient of -0.556
implies that if a district’s intensity of villagization in 1978 increased by one per-
centage point relative to the mean, consumption in 2011/12 would fall by 0.556%,
on average. The IV estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate, suggesting that
unobservable factors determining the current consumption (such as rural location)
are positively correlated with villagization. The OLS estimate of the coe cient
of villagization may reflect the additional e↵ect of the unobservable factors. The
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IV estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate because the IV method purges the
positive correlation between villagization and unobservable factors determining con-
sumption. The fact that the impact of villagization is larger for currently rural
residents and farming households but not urban residents suggests that agriculture
may be a potential channel through which villagization may have a↵ected current
consumption. The next section examines this hypothesis in detail.
All household characteristics have the anticipated signs and are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Larger households, households with a higher dependency
ratio, and female-headed households have lower consumption while households with
a literate and older household head are associated with higher per capita consump-
tion. Cattle-holding is a statistically significant predictor of household consumption
at the 1% level in my preferred specification, suggesting that household wealth is
positively correlated with consumption. An extra head of cattle owned by a house-
hold is associated with 3.6% higher per capita household consumption on average,
holding other variables constant. The mean rainfall is not found to be a significant
predictor of household consumption, suggesting that households may have already
incorporated this variable into their decision-making.
3.6.3 Robustness checks
In this section, I examine if the result in the previous section holds when subjected
to various robustness checks. Are the results in Table 3.5 robust to an alternative
measure of villagization? An advantage of using NPS data to analyze the e↵ect of
the villagization program is that we can exploit an alternative measure of villagiza-
tion. All 349 communities interviewed in NPS were asked if they were newly formed
during the villagization campaign in the 1970s. A majority of these communities
(71%) were in fact newly formed during this period, which permits the use of this
dummy variable as an alternative measure of villagization. Columns 3 and 4 of
Table ?? (page 47) present OLS and IV estimates with this alternative measure of
villagization. The IV estimate of villagization is larger than the coe cient using
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the district-level villagization measure (-1.014 vs. -0.522) and statistically signific-
ant at the 1% level. The OLS coe cient is indistinguishable from zero, possibly
due to attenuation bias resulting from measurement error in this variable. The IV
estimates are reassuring in the sense that if anything, a community-level measure of
villagization has the same sign and significance as the district-level measure. The
magnitude of the coe cients of the two measures of villagization cannot be com-
pared meaningfully: the continuous measure of the intensity of villagization is at
the district level while the dichotomous measure simply says whether a community
was newly established during the villagization process or not.
Table 3.6: Dependent variable is log of household consumption (NPS data)
I then examine if results reported in Table 3.5 are robust to alternative outcome
measures. Table A.1 (page 129) presents the results of regressions in which the e↵ect
of villagization is examined on a variety of outcome measures using data from HBS.
The outcomes considered are household per capita income, an index of household
assets, average years of education in the household, whether the household has access
to piped water, and whether the household’s primary source of lighting is electricity.
The results are consistent with results in Table 3.5 villagization in 1978 had a
negative e↵ect on all of these outcomes. The result on education is particularly
surprising since universal education, although abandoned in the mid-1980s, was a
key feature of the villagization program.
I finally examine if results reported in Table 3.5 are driven by the presence of
